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INSTITUTIONALIZING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY REFORMS: 
THE PROBLEM OF MAKING POLICE REFORMS ENDURE 
SAMUEL WALKER* 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINING POLICE REFORMS 
The history of police reform in America, in the sense of modern day 
notions of police professionalization, is more than a century old.1 Over that 
time period there have been successive waves of reform movements, with a 
changing set of objectives and programs.2 Much has been accomplished to 
improve policing over this long period.3 Whether the benchmark is one-
hundred years, fifty years or only twenty years ago, it is possible to see 
significant reforms in police management, crime fighting tactics, police 
personnel standards and training, the diversity of the work force, constitutional 
standards for policing, and the accountability of officers for their actions in 
critical situations. The community oriented policing (COP) movement, 
moreover, represents a fundamental change in thinking about the role of the 
police in society that rejects the professional model that dominated police 
thinking for most of the twentieth century about how police organizations 
should attempt to fulfill that role.4 
Nonetheless, reformers and police scholars alike have given little attention 
to the question of ensuring that achieved reforms endure and become a 
permanent part of an individual department or of policing in general.5 The 
police literature contains only a few references to the institutionalization or 
sustainability of reforms, and the discussions are typically very brief.6 Part of 
the problem, Stephen Mastrofski and James Willis importantly note, is that 
police scholars face enormous difficulties in tracking “changes in police 
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 1. SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM ix (1977). 
 2. Id. 
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 4. See Jack R. Greene, Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure, 
and Function of the Police, in 3 POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 312 (Julie Horney ed., 2000). 
 5. See Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity and 
Change: Into the Twenty-first Century, in 39 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 55, 
57 (Michael Tonry ed., 2010). 
 6. See id. at 75–76. 
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organizations over long time periods.”7 Scholars are naturally averse to 
examining subjects that pose serious measurement problems. Lawrence 
Sherman cynically noted more than thirty years ago that in studying the 
persistence of anti-corruption reforms it is almost impossible to determine if “a 
department was truly reformed to begin with.”8 
The lack of interest in institutionalizing reform is all the more remarkable 
because of the growing literature on police reform itself. David Bayley noted 
years ago that the late twentieth century has been arguably “the most creative 
period in policing” since the creation of the modern police in 1829.9 Several 
scholars have attempted to survey various reforms, which include community 
policing, problem-oriented policing, hot-spots policing, anti-terrorist police 
policies, major innovations in accountability, significant changes in police 
technology, and dramatic changes in the composition of the police work 
force.10 Wesley Skogan systematically listed and discussed the reasons “Why 
[police] Reforms Fail,” finding eleven separate factors.11 While extremely 
valuable, his article did not discuss how those various obstacles might be 
overcome in order to enhance the sustainability of reform.12 
Only two publications to date have explored the issue of institutionalizing 
police reforms in detail.13 Rachel Boba and John Crank define 
institutionalization as “establish[ing] as normal or mak[ing] something a 
customary and accepted part of the organization.”14 With regard to problem-
oriented policing as a reform, they argue that responsibility for the reform must 
be “distributed across the rank structure . . . integrat[ing] problem solving, 
analysis, and accountability at all levels” of the organization.15 Similarly, Trent 
 
 7. Id. at 127. 
 8. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM: CONTROLLING POLICE 
CORRUPTION 261–62 (1978). 
 9. DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 101 (1994). 
 10. Mastrofski & Willis, supra note 5, at 117; David H. Bayley, Police Reform: Who Done 
It?, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 7, 8 (2008); Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 POLICING & 
SOC’Y 23, 23 (2008); see also INTERNATIONAL POLICE EXECUTIVE SYMPOSIUM, POLICE 
REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM UP (Monique Marks & David Sklansky eds., 2012). 
 11. Skogan, supra note 10, at 23. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See TRENT IKERD & SAMUEL WALKER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. 
ORIENTED POLICING SERV., MAKING POLICE REFORMS ENDURE: THE KEYS FOR SUCCESS 5 
(2010), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e04106264_policereforms_fin.pdf; 
Rachel Boba & John P. Crank, Institutionalizing Problem-Oriented Policing: Rethinking 
Problem-Solving, Analysis, and Accountability, 9 POLICE PRACT. & RES. 379, 379 (2008). 
 14. Boba & Crank, supra note 13, at 384. 
 15. Id. at 385, 391. In his twenty-year assessment of problem-oriented policing, Scott argues 
that it will have “succeeded” when it has been “integrated” into a department’s operations “at 
least as completely as . . . other operational strategies” of patrol, response to incidents, and 
investigation. MICHAEL S. SCOTT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED 
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Ikerd and this Author define institutionalization as occurring when a particular 
reform becomes “a way of regularly conducting police business,” and “when 
certain norms, values, and structures are incorporated into an organization.”16 
As discussed in detail later, this can be achieved when the reform in question is 
incorporated into regular police practice, in department-wide training, and in 
personnel practices including regular performance evaluations and 
promotions.17 
Reformers undoubtedly have been so engaged in the struggle just to 
achieve a particular reform that they have not been able to think about the 
long-term future. Today, the continuity of police reforms is a problem that 
cannot be ignored. This Article examines the issue of the continuity of 
accountability-related reforms,18 but has general applicability and relevance to 
community oriented policing (COP),19 problem oriented policing (POP),20 and 
essentially all significant police reforms. 
Accountability-related reforms are defined in this Article as (1) policies 
and procedures designed to ensure that police officers obey the law and, also, 
policies on treating citizens in a lawful, respectful, and unbiased manner; (2) 
policies and procedures ensuring that incidents of alleged misconduct are 
properly reported and then investigated thoroughly and fairly; (3) policies and 
procedures ensuring that proven incidents of misconduct result in appropriate 
discipline; and (4) policies and procedures ensuring that police departments 
take proactive steps to prevent officer misconduct in the future. Section I of 
this Article provides a brief history of notable police reforms that eventually 
faded away. Section II provides a very brief history of the major reform efforts 
in policing, with a discussion of why those reforms generally failed to develop 
mechanisms to ensure their own continuity. Section III discusses the issue of 
the police officer subculture—and the related issue of police unions—which 
many, if not most, police experts believe are major obstacles to all police 
reforms and accountability–related reforms in particular. Section IV covers 
recent federal pattern or practice investigations and settlements because they 
represent the most concerted effort at present to change police organizations as 
a whole—raising important questions about the continuity of the effort itself 
and the specific reforms that are mandated. Section V develops a framework 
 
POLICING SERV., PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 
132 (2000). 
 16. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 5. 
 17. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 18. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY: EXAMPLES OF 
PROMISING POLICE PRACTICES AND POLICIES 10–13 (2001) (providing the best short statement 
of the specific policies and programs designed to achieve accountability); see also SAMUEL 
WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 20–21 (2005). 
 19. Greene, supra note 4, at 301. 
 20. SCOTT, supra note 15, at 1–4. 
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for both institutionalizing accountability-related reforms and also for assessing 
the extent to which such reforms have been institutionalized.21 
I.  THE LONG HISTORY OF REFORMS THAT JUST FADE AWAY 
There is a long history of major police reforms (that is, reforms that were 
considered important in their time) that simply faded away.22 Particularly 
notable in this regard were the anti-corruption reforms instituted in the New 
York City Police Department (NYPD) in the early 1970s in the wake of the 
“Serpico” scandal and the subsequent Knapp Commission investigation.23 
Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy introduced anti-corruption reforms 
that attempted to both decentralize responsibility for identifying and 
investigating alleged corrupt activities while also strengthening the centralized 
Internal Affairs Division (IAD) which had overall responsibility for integrity 
within the NYPD.24 Murphy’s decentralization strategy is particularly relevant 
for the discussion in this Article because it was intended to enhance the sense 
of responsibility for integrity throughout the department and thereby change 
the culture of the department. Among other things, it was intended to end the 
traditional “us versus them” view among rank and file officers that internal 
affairs represented “head hunters” whose mission was to “get” them, and in 
this respect create a department-wide commitment to accountability.25 
Yet, three decades later another major corruption scandal erupted in the 
NYPD, and the resulting Mollen Commission investigation found that the 
Murphy anti-corruption reforms had simply evaporated.26 In fact, the Mollen 
Commission reported that the integrity problem in the NYPD had worsened, 
with the emergence of a new form of corruption that combined traditional 
money-related corrupt actions with officer violence against criminal suspects.27 
The Mollen Commission concluded that the earlier reforms had collapsed 
 
 21. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 13–15. 
 22. WALKER, supra note 18, at 161. 
 23. KNAPP COMM’N, THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 16–18, 
231 (1972). Reforms already underway at the time of the report, and recommendations for long-
term reform. Id. at 1–34, 231–44. “Serpico” became the popular shorthand name for a scandal 
that was far broader than the activities of officer Frank Serpico. Id. at 196–201. 
 24. Id. at 22–23, 30–34. 
 25. PATRICK V. MURPHY & THOMAS PLATE, COMMISSIONER: A VIEW FROM THE TOP OF 
AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 162–65 (1978); SHERMAN, supra note 8, at 128–30; THE N.Y.C. 
COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION 
PROCEDURES OF THE DEP’T, COMMISSION REPORT 15, 74–75 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN 
COMMISSION] (describing the 1970s reforms); see also Aogán Mulcahy, ‘Headhunter’ or ‘Real 
Cop’?: Identity in the World of Internal Affairs Officers, 24 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 99, 
105–09 (1995). 
 26. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 76. 
 27. Id. at 17. 
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because “no institutional mechanism” was created to ensure that they 
functioned as intended.28 The lesson of the NYPD experience appears to be 
that simply introducing new policies and procedures is inadequate without 
special attention to ensuring both full implementation and continuity over time. 
A second notable example of a failed reform is the Team Policing 
experiment that briefly swept through American policing in the 1970s.29 A 
1978 survey reported that innumerable police departments were engaged in 
Team Policing.30 Almost completely forgotten today, Team Policing was a half 
step in the direction of community policing, embodying some of the principles 
that would later flourish, but lacking a number of key ingredients.31 It sought to 
bring police operations closer to neighborhoods through decentralization—as 
does COP. But it did not involve a broader rethinking about the police role that 
characterizes COP, nor did it fully consider how an alternative way of 
delivering police services would be integrated into the traditional 
organizational structure and procedures.32 Beset by unresolved conceptual 
problems, poor planning, and implementation problems, Team Policing 
collapsed almost as quickly as it had arisen and was soon forgotten.33 In a 
telling comment on how reforms fade away, a former NYPD official stated in 
the mid-1980s that, “[t]here was no memo announcing the formal end of the 
[Team Policing] experiment” in the department.34 
A third example of a major reform (although the ultimate outcome is still 
uncertain) is community oriented policing (COP) and its first cousin, problem 
oriented policing (POP), which represent the major police reform efforts of the 
last thirty years.35 COP involves a rethinking of the police role, with an 
emphasis on closer relations with communities and neighborhoods.36 The key 
organizational changes involve the decentralization of police services and the 
development of crime and disorder policies tailored to each neighborhood.37 
POP—which is more of a strategy that incorporates important elements of 
 
 28. Id. at 16–17 (the “new” corruption”), 75 (“no institutional mechanisms”), 70–109 (full 
discussion of the “collapse”). It is important to note that Commissioner Murphy left the NYPD 
shortly after his anti-corruption reforms were initiated and he avoided the challenge of fully 
instituting them. MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 25, at 16. 
 29. SHERMAN ET AL., TEAM POLICING: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 107–08 (1973); GAY ET AL., 
NEIGHBORHOOD TEAM POLICING ix (1977). 
 30. JOHN F. HEAPHY, POLICE PRACTICES: THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY 12 
(1978). 
 31. GARY GORDNER, COMMUNITY POLICING: PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS 1 (1996). 
 32. Greene, supra note 4, at 307, 328–29. 
 33. Samuel Walker, Does Anyone Remember Team Policing? Lessons of the Team Policing 
Experience for Community Policing, 12 AM. J. POLICE 33, 34–35 (1993). 
 34. Id. at 46. 
 35. SCOTT, supra note 15, at 97–99. 
 36. Greene, supra note 4, at 301. 
 37. Id. at 307. 
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COP—involves disaggregating the categories of crime and disorder and 
developing carefully targeted responses to particular “problems” (e.g., 
residential burglaries, graffiti, etc.).38 The availability of large amounts of 
federal funding in the 1990s resulted in COP being adopted by innumerable 
police departments across the country.39 The initial enthusiasm has long since 
passed. And while the concept survives as conventional rhetoric, there is no 
national assessment of the extent to which the key organizational aspects 
survive as an operational reality in various departments.40 With regard to POP, 
a national center provides both a focus for the concept and abundant 
information about current activities across the country.41 
The COP experience raises the same issue discussed above with regard to 
the anti-corruption efforts in the NYPD in the 1970s.42 It appears there was no 
recognition of the problem of maintaining an innovation and no attempt to 
develop mechanisms to ensure the continuity of COP once the initial 
enthusiasm waned, or the federal grant expired.43 The situation with respect to 
POP, however, is more hopeful. The Center on Problem Oriented Policing at 
the University of Wisconsin maintains a focus on the concept with a broad 
program of publications, a national competition for a national award, and an 
annual conference that helps to keep the concept revitalized.44 As discussed 
below, at least one department did institute policy and procedural changes 
designed to institutionalize POP in the department and ensure its continuity.45 
 
 38. See, e.g., Problem Specific Guides, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, 
http://www.popcenter.org/problems (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (listing some problems which can 
be addressed by POP). 
 39. Greene, supra note 4, at 301–02. 
 40. Greene, supra note 4, at 327. For COP–related examples see Skogan, supra note 10, at 
25–26, 27, 29–30, 33. 
 41. Mission of the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED 
POLICING, http://www.popcenter.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). The future of the Center 
is in doubt, as the Justice Department indicated in the fall of 2012 that it would cease its financial 
support. 
 42. See MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 74. 
 43. Id. at 75. The most ambitious COP effort was the Chicago Police Department’s Chicago 
Alternative Policing Services (CAPS) program. The extensive evaluations over the course of 
several years found positive results in a number of dimensions. WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN T. 
HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING CHICAGO STYLE 20 (1997). CAPS is still mentioned on the 
Chicago Police Department website, along with an extensive program of “beat meetings” that 
were a core element of CAPS, but anecdotal evidence raises questions about whether the 
department and the city are still fully committed to the program. See How CAPS Works, CHI. 
POLICE DEP’T, https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/Get%20Involved/ 
How%20CAPS%20works (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
 44. See POP Conference, CTR. FOR PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING, http://www.popcenter. 
org/conference (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (describing POP conference and the competition). 
 45. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 11–12; see also infra pp. 25–29. 
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Federal pattern and practice investigations under Section 14141 of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 represent a final 
example of a major police organizational reform effort.46 It is particularly 
relevant for this topic as a broad effort to introduce accountability-related 
reforms in police departments. To date, Justice Department investigations have 
resulted in over twenty settlements involving consent decrees or memoranda of 
agreement (MOA) requiring major reforms.47 The principal reforms—common 
to all the consent decrees and MOA—involve developing state of the art use of 
force policies, an early intervention system, and creating an open and 
accessible citizen complaint process.48 As that effort is still ongoing, it is still 
too early to provide a final assessment of its success.49 
There is some preliminary evidence that the pattern or practice effort has 
been successful in a number of departments.50 The reports of the independent 
court-appointed monitors in several of these cases have reported significant 
success.51 In Washington, D.C., after six and a half years of MOA ordered 
reforms, the monitor reported in 2008 that the department had “substantially 
transformed itself,” and recommended termination of the MOA.52 Similarly, 
 
 46. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A 
Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 479 (2008). 
 47. Id. ; SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (describing the work of the Special 
Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice). 
 48. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 487. 
 49. Id. at 481. 
 50. Id. Walker and Macdonald relied primarily on the reports of the court-appointed 
monitors for their assessment of the impact of the various consent decrees and MOAs. Id. at 515. 
There are concededly some risks in relying heavily on those sources. Id. The major exception is 
Detroit, where the monitoring process has been embroiled in scandal. Former Detroit Police 
Monitor Censured – Not Disbarred – For Fling with Kwame Kilpatrick, MLIVE (Oct. 21, 2011, 
11:27 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/10/former_detroit_police_moni 
tor_2.html. The Settlement Agreement regarding the Oakland, California, Police Department was 
the result of a private law suit, but the Agreement is identical in content to the settlements 
resulting from Justice Department litigation. Press Release, City of Oakland, Office of the City 
Attorney, City of Oakland Settles ‘Riders’ Civil Rights Suits (Feb. 19, 2003), http://www.oak 
landcityattorney.org/PDFS/Riders/Riders%20final%20settlement.pdf. As of summer 2012, the 
federal judge in the case was extremely frustrated by the failure to implement the Agreement after 
nine years, and has threatened to place the police department in “receivership.” The exact nature 
of receivership, which has no known precedent in policing, is unknown. See Matthew Artz, 
Attorneys Want Investigation into Oakland Leak of Allegations Against Federal Monitor, 
OAKLAND TRIBUNE (Aug. 23, 2012, 6:58:12AM), http://www.insidebayarea.com/oakland/ci_213 
78091/attorneys-want-investigation-into-oakland-leak. 
 51. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 479–80. 
 52. MICHAEL BROMWICH, INDEPENDENT POLICE MONITOR: TWENTY-THIRD QUARTERLY 
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 4 
(2008). 
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the monitor for the New Jersey State Police reported in 2007 that the agency 
had become “self-monitoring and self-correcting.”53 
Recent news reports, however, have raised questions about whether the 
reforms in some of the departments where consent decrees or MOA were 
successfully terminated remain viable.54 In September 2011, for example, it 
was reported that twenty-three officers had been arrested on criminal charges 
so far that year in Washington, D.C.55 A September 2012 news story, 
meanwhile, reported that over ninety officers had been arrested on criminal 
charges in the previous three and a half years.56 Arrest on any charge for a 
police officer is concerning, but the number of arrests in this department—with 
some of the arrests involving sex with a minor, burglary, and shooting of 
transgendered people—raises very serious questions about whether the 
accountability procedures instituted by the MOA are functioning at all.57 
Meanwhile, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a police officer remained on duty in 
2012 despite three separate allegations of attempts to extort sexual favors from 
women in cases between 2008 and 2012.58 Additionally, in 2011 it was 
revealed that an officer was on duty despite thirty-three citizen complaints and 
that another officer had two-dozen complaints.59 All of the cases cited here 
involve the kind of pattern of officer misconduct that the consent decree 
mandate reforms, and the early intervention systems (discussed infra in 
Part V.B), are designed to track.60 
There has been no systematic inquiry into the current state of police 
departments where consent decrees or MOAs have been terminated to 
 
 53. PUBLIC MGMT. RES. & LITE, DEPALMA, GREENBERG & RIVAS, MONITORS’ SIXTEENTH 
REPORT 4 (2007), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/monitors-report-16.pdf. 
 54. Scott McCabe, 23 D.C. Cops Charged with Crimes in 2011, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 19, 
2012, 2:42PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/23-d.c.-cops-charged-with-crimes-in-2011/ 
article/118035#.UEODfWgm_FJ. 
 55. Id. ; see also 16 D.C. Police Officers Arrested So Far This Year, WUSA9, (June 16, 
2011, 10:20PM), http://wusa9.com/news/article/155215/158/16-DC-Police-Officers-Arrested-So-
Far-This-Year.. 
 56. Aubrey Whelan, 90-plus Arrests of D.C. Cops in Under 4 Years, WASH. EXAMINER 
(Sept. 9, 2012, 8:00PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/90-plus-arrests-of-d.c.-cops-in-under-4-
years/article/2507386#.UIgLk2l25ak. 
 57. McCabe, supra note 54. 
 58. Margaret Harding, Pittsburgh Police Defend Handling of Suspected Officer, 
PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE–REVIEW (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/ 
news/pittsburgh/print_782627.html. 
 59. Id.; Lauren Daley, Pittsburgh Police Officer Subject of Multiple Allegations, 
PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/pittsburgh-
police-officer-subject-of-multiple-allegations/Content?oid=1381169; ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., 
TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH’S EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT 
DECREE 5 (2002), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/pittsburgh_9-02.pdf. 
 60. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 7–8. 
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determine whether the achieved reforms are still viable several years after the 
fact.61 The incidents cited above, while concededly anecdotal, raise serious 
questions about the reforms that were achieved in those departments. A 
systematic study of several post-consent decree departments would yield 
valuable evidence on the continuity of reforms and the factors associated with 
success or failure in that regard. 
II.  PAST APPROACHES TO POLICE REFORM 
A discussion of making police reforms endure requires an examination of 
past police reform strategies to highlight their shortcomings with regard to the 
continuity of reforms that were attempted and in many instances, at least in 
part, achieved. 
Police reform between the 1920s and the 1960s relied primarily on a strong 
police chief executive who would effect change in a top-down strategy.62 The 
most famous examples were August Vollmer,63 O.W. Wilson,64 Clarence 
Kelley,65 and Patrick V. Murphy.66 These individuals achieved commendable 
and overdue reforms in the departments they led, particularly with regard to 
raising personnel standards and introducing concepts of modern organizational 
management.67 Additionally, these individuals served as important role models 
for chiefs and future chiefs in other jurisdictions, and in many instances trained 
subordinates who went on to become chiefs elsewhere.68 The obvious problem 
with the strong chief approach to reform is that chiefs all eventually leave their 
 
 61. Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using 
Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 376 
(2011). 
 62. Craig D. Uchida, The Development of the American Police: An Historical Overview, in 
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 18–21 (Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger 
G. Dunham eds., 4th ed. 2001). 
 63. See AUGUST VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY 3–4, 8 (1936) (there is no 
biography of Vollmer). 
 64. See WILLIAM J. BOPP, “O.W”: O.W. WILSON AND THE SEARCH FOR A POLICE 
PROFESSION 102–07 (1977). 
 65. See e.g., GEORGE KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL 
EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT 5 (1974) (explaining Clarence Kelley’s key role in 
sponsoring the historic preventive patrol study in Kansas City while he was chief of the 
department), available at http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/kcppe.pdf. 
 66. See MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 25, at 130–37. 
 67. See VOLLMER, supra note 63; see also BOPP, supra note 64; see also KELLING ET AL., 
supra note 65; see also MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 25. 
 68. Craig Fisher, PERF Report Offers Police Leaders’ Perspectives On Immigration 
Enforcement, SUBJECT TO DEBATE (Police Executive Research Forum, D.C.), Jan./Feb. 2012, at 
2–3, available at http://www.policeforum.org/library/subject-to-debate/2012/Debate_Jan-Feb 
2012_web1.pdf. 
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departments.69 In all of the cases cited in this Article, while certain reforms 
remained in place, they did not establish institutional mechanisms that would 
ensure the continuity of many of their reforms.70 The case of Patrick V. 
Murphy’s anti-corruption reforms in New York City cited supra illustrates the 
problem.71 As a result, thinking about police reform began to advance beyond 
the focus on a strong leader and started considering institutional reforms that 
would last beyond the tenure of any chief executive. 
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing until today, the principal focus of 
police reform has been administrative rulemaking to control officer behavior 
on the street.72 Administrative rulemaking involves developing formal written 
policies to guide officer discretion in critical incidents such as the use of 
deadly force,73 other forms of less-than-lethal force, handling domestic 
violence incidents,74 and high speed vehicle pursuits.75 The evidence indicates 
that several of these reforms achieved significant results in reducing the 
inappropriate and harmful police conduct as intended—particularly with the 
use of deadly force and high-speed vehicle pursuits.76 
The major limitation of the administrative rulemaking approach to reform 
relates directly to the issue of the organizational culture of a police department, 
which is at the heart of the problem of making reforms endure.77 A written 
policy (e.g., on less-than-lethal force), no matter how well crafted, is nothing 
 
 69. Skogan, supra note 10, at 32–33 (arguing that “[r]eform may not survive leadership 
transition” as a major reason why police reforms fail, and citing a number of very telling 
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 70. See, e.g., id. (discussing how police chiefs leave their departments and new police chiefs 
enter, changing the former chief’s reforms). 
 71. See MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 25, at 162–65 (detailing how Commissioner Murphy 
left soon after putting in place anti-corruption reforms in the New York City Police Department 
in the 1970s). 
 72. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 1950-1990, at 32 (1993); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 99–101 (1975). 
 73. Lorie A. Fridell, Deadly Force Policy and Practice: The Forces of Change, in HOLDING 
POLICE ACCOUNTABLE 32–34 (Candace McCoy ed., 2010); William A. Geller, Deadly Force: 
What We Know, 10 J. OF POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 151, 169 (1982) (discussing written policies 
regarding police policy). 
 74. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND 
DILEMMAS 253–55 (1992). 
 75. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LORIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE VEHICLES AND FIREARMS: 
INSTRUMENTS OF DEADLY FORCE 117 (1992). 
 76. JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, POLICING 
AND HOMICIDE, 1976-98: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY POLICE, POLICE OFFICERS MURDERED BY 
FELONS 1–3 (2001), available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ph98.pdf. Walker, supra note 
33, at 48. 
 77. See discussion infra Part I. 
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more than a piece of paper78 and will have no meaningful impact on police 
conduct if it is not properly enforced through a reporting requirement, 
thorough investigations, and the imposition of appropriate discipline where it is 
warranted. The problem is illustrated by the 2000 Justice Department consent 
decree settlement with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).79 That 
settlement was far longer and more detailed than, for example, the 1997 
consent decree involving the Pittsburgh Police Department. A major part of the 
explanation is that the LAPD, unlike the Pittsburg Police Department, had in 
place policies on the use of force that were at least close to emerging national 
standards.80 The problem in the LAPD lay with the administration of those 
policies, and the LAPD consent decree contains elaborate requirements 
designed to improve that enforcement.81 The problem of enforcing internally 
developed policies is a variant on the well-recognized problem of enforcing 
Supreme Court decisions that constrain police actions. Just as the Supreme 
Court has no enforcement mechanism,82 the enforcement of department-
generated policies depends entirely on the will of the police chief executive.83 
In turn, the will of the police chief depends on the commitment of that person, 
his or her administrative skills, and the power of countervailing forces such as 
political influence, a police union, and the police officer subculture.84 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF THE POLICE OFFICER SUBCULTURE 
A. The Problematic Concept of a Police Officer Subculture 
Police reformers and scholars commonly refer to the organizational culture 
of policing, but this is an extremely complex phenomenon—including the 
formal organizational structure of a department, its official policies and 
procedures, and the generally deeply ingrained day-to-day practices. It also 
includes what is called the police officer subculture.85 The officer subculture is 
 
 78. Constitutional law scholars may prefer to call them “parchment barriers.” James 
Madison, Federalist Paper No. 48: The Same Subject Continued with a View to the Means of 
Giving Efficacy in Practice to that Maxim, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 309 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987). 
 79. Consent Decree, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002), available at http://www.lapdonline.org/ 
assets/pdf/final_consent_decree.pdf. 
 80. Id. at 24–26. 
 81. United States v. Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 401 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 82. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 772–76, 816 
(2012). 
 83. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 518, 521–22 (2004). 
 84. See id. at 512; see also discussion infra pp. 1–4. 
 85. See generally Armacost, supra note 83, at 513–14. 
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defined here as the set “attitudes and values that shape officers’ behavior.”86 It 
is extremely relevant to this Article because of its influence over both official 
departmental policies and informal departmental practices and procedures. 
While this phenomenon is widely discussed, it has been little studied.87 An 
increasing number of scholars, however, have questioned whether the 
traditional elements of the concept are valid.88 The police subculture 
commands our attention because it is generally seen as a major obstacle to 
reform and, thus, a powerful force working to erode any reforms that are in 
fact achieved.89 In a review of recent police reforms, David Bayley comments 
that, “[p]olice rank-and-file have not been the source of significant reform 
ideas.”90 The Mollen Commission, meanwhile, concluded that in order to 
reduce or eliminate corruption in the NYPD, “the [d]epartment must transform 
[the] police culture.”91 If the traditional concept of the police officer subculture 
is not valid—as suggested in the discussion that follows—then potential for 
both implementing reforms and institutionalizing them may be greater than 
most observers of the police generally believe.92 
The concept of a police officer subculture is enveloped in myths and 
stereotypes, many of which fly in the face of a constantly changing reality.93 
The concept originated with the first important scholarly work on the police.94 
 
 86. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 51. 
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(2006). 
 88. See Steve Herbert, Police Subculture Reconsidered, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 343, 343 (1998); 
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in Policing: The Implications of “Glacial Change,” 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 555, 555–56, 563–66 
(1985). See infra text accompanying note 91. 
 89. See Herbert, supra note 88, at 363. 
 90. BAYLEY, supra note 9, at 7. See also Skogan, supra note 10, at 26–28 (noting also the 
threat of police unions to reform). 
 91. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 69. The reforms proposed by the Commission, 
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training, especially integrity training, better management procedures, some changes in union 
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RECEPTIVITY TO POLICE INNOVATION: A TALE OF TWO CITIES 1, 6–10 (2011), available at 
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is still in process, is yielding a number of studies very relevant to many of the questions raised in 
this article. NATIONAL POLICE RESEARCH PLATFORM, http://www.nationalpoliceresearch.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
 93. See Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1213, 1231–32, 1242–43. 
 94. E.g., BAYLEY, supra note 9, at 11. 
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The seminal work of William Westley95 and Jerome Skolnick96 established a 
now stereotyped image of the police officer subculture that continues to exert a 
powerful influence on both popular and scholarly thinking about the police, 
although in the face of considerable evidence that it is no longer valid.97 The 
original concept posits a homogenous work group, dominated by white males, 
with limited education, conservative political values, and a deep cynicism 
about people, the criminal justice system, and their own departments.98 
Officers are said to have an insular and defensive attitude about allegations of 
police misconduct,99 and are resistant to change, particularly with reforms that 
impinge directly on their on-the-street conduct.100 In the 1960s, police unions 
arose in part as expressions of fierce rank and file opposition to programs 
designed to improve police–community relations and reduce racial tensions.101 
The rank and file and their unions continue to be the principal opponents of 
affirmative action in police hiring and the creation of independent citizen 
oversight mechanisms.102 
The demographics of the American police work force have changed 
dramatically over the course of the last few decades, however, calling into 
question the traditional concept of the police officer subculture.103 People of 
color, women, homosexuals, and college-educated officers are now a 
significant presence in most medium-sized to large police departments.104 Law 
professor David Sklansky quite properly characterizes police forces today as 
“Not Your Father’s Police Department.” 105 African-American officers, 
Hispanic officers, or a combination of the two, constitute a majority of the 
officers in a growing number of departments.106 Women are also a significant 
 
 95. See generally WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY (1970). 
 96. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (4th ed. 2011). 
 97. Walker, supra note 88, at 556, 563, 565. 
 98. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1210, 1213, 1224, 1233–34, 1241–42. 
 99. See id. at 1213. 
 100. SKOLNICK, supra note 96, at 241–42. The Mollen Commission report gave special 
emphasis to the officer subculture and the need to change it if the anti-corruption effort is to 
succeed. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 51–69. 
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199 (2d ed. 1998). 
 102. Id. at 199–200. 
 103. See Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1213–23. 
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Paved by Degree?, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 77, 79 (2001) (discussing college–educated officers). 
 105. Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1209. 
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presence, although there appears to be a ceiling in the range of twenty percent 
of all officers.107 Finally, gay and lesbian officers are open about their sexual 
orientation in a number of departments.108 The demographic fragmentation of 
police departments is indicated by the existence of private associations for 
African-American,109 Latino,110 female,111 and lesbian and gay officers.112 
Education levels have also risen significantly since the years when the 
subculture stereotype first emerged.113 
Research and anecdotal evidence indicates significant variations in 
attitudes among police officers of different backgrounds. A Police Foundation 
survey of officer attitudes toward the use of force found striking differences 
based on race. African-American officers were much more willing to concede 
that officers in their department did use excessive force, and that officers were 
more likely to use excessive force against people of color.114 There are 
examples of African-American officers, through their race-based professional 
associations, speaking out on police misconduct in ways that are very different 
from the views of the police union representing a majority of the 
department.115 Susan Martin, meanwhile, examined the impact on the officer 
subculture in her study of the early years of female officers being assigned to 
routine patrol duty.116 The introduction of women on an equal basis with men 
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challenged the traditional police ethos of masculinity, exposed divisions 
among male officers with regard to women in policing, and added complex 
new issues regarding social relations and sexual harassment among officers.117 
The increased demographic diversity of the American police work force is 
relevant to the subject of this Article because if the officer subculture is not as 
monolithic as traditionally portrayed, there are potential sources of support for 
innovation and accountability-related reform within police departments. Both 
the National Police Research Platform and the Chicago CAPS program provide 
empirical support for this proposition.118 While this evidence provides some 
basis for optimism, Skogan reminds us of the difficulty of getting the rank and 
file to support innovation—accountability-related reforms in particular.119 
Innovations require officers to “do many of their old jobs in new ways,” and 
some of these tasks often “lie outside the traditional roles for which they were 
selected and trained” and in which they have much experience.120 This is 
particularly true of early intervention systems (EIS), which involve not just a 
new accountability tool but new demands on supervisors’ time,121 and—more 
seriously—an entirely new approach to personnel performance evaluation.122 
B. Police Unions and Their Impact 
Police unions are arguably the most important, neglected aspect of 
American policing.123 Listening to everyday rhetoric, it seems that virtually 
everyone with an interest in policing—citizens, civic leaders, reform activists, 
and scholars—believes that police unions are extremely powerful, have a 
major influence on police practices, and are a principal obstacle to change.124 
While the police officer subculture and police unions overlap in many 
important respects, it is necessary to distinguish between certain attitudes and 
behaviors as inherent in the law enforcement occupation and police unions as 
an institution. Unions with formal collective bargaining agreements exist in 
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about half of all local law enforcement agencies, representing 71 percent of all 
sworn officers.125 Thus, to the extent that there are certain attitudes and 
behaviors associated with police officers, they are also found in those police 
departments where there is no union and collective bargaining agreement.126 
As already noted, the relevance of police unions for purposes of this 
Article is the extent to which they are or can be an obstacle to change.127 
Collective bargaining agreements, for example, contain provisions related to 
the investigation of alleged officer misconduct (whether on the basis of a 
citizen complaint or an internally generated complaint) that impede a timely 
and thorough investigation.128 Officer appeals of discipline, meanwhile, may 
involve procedures that tend to increase the likelihood of disciplinary sanctions 
being mitigated or overturned.129 Finally, unions—as institutions with financial 
resources and political influence—can effectively resist accountability-related 
reforms in those departments where they exist.130 The most obvious example 
of the negative impact of this political influence on police reform would be 
unions helping to elect mayors who are sympathetic to their perspective and 
who may appoint a police chief who is not committed to high standards of 
accountability. 
C. Variations Among Police Departments 
The traditional concept of the police officer subculture suggests that all 
police are the same in all departments.131 Growing evidence, however, suggests 
this is not true and that there are meaningful differences between 
departments.132 Additionally, individual departments change sometimes slowly 
and sometimes dramatically as a result of new leadership.133 Anecdotal 
evidence has always suggested that some departments have reputations for 
being more professional than others, while some departments have ingrained 
patterns of corruption and officer violence against citizens.134 Unfortunately, 
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no systematic research has investigated these various reputations to confirm or 
refute their validity.135 Recent research from the National Police Research 
Platform (NPRP), however, provides evidence of significant differences 
among police departments, particularly with regard to receptivity to 
innovation.136 
The idea that the organizational environment of police departments might 
vary in important respects should not be that surprising. The literature on 
criminal courts, for example, has identified significant differences in the work 
environment of different court systems and how those differences impact the 
processing of cases.137 The variations among police departments, if validated 
and amplified by further research, offer some hope for changing the subculture 
of individual departments and, by extension, hope for institutionalizing 
reforms. Variations are believed to be the result of certain management 
practices—suggesting that officer behavior is malleable and responsive to the 
rules, rewards, and punishments within an organization.138 If this is true, it 
suggests that a concerted reform effort—with a special focus on taking steps 
necessary to sustain organizational changes—could in fact change the police 
subculture, substantially diminishing resistance to new accountability reforms. 
New evidence from the National Police Research Platform (NPRP) 
provides important evidence-based reasons for optimism about the possibilities 
for changing the officer subculture within police departments.139 The NPRP is 
an ambitious long-term study of police organizations and their officers 
involving twenty-nine police departments across the country.140 Several 
research reports generated by the NPRP to date are relevant for this Article. 
The NPRP report, The Longitudinal Study of First Line Supervisors, involved 
169 newly appointed first line supervisors who participated in 16 training 
classes in 3 departments.141 The new supervisors were presented with a 
scenario involving a problem for supervisors and then surveyed before and 
after their training.142 The percentage of the supervisors agreeing or strongly 
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agreeing with the statement “[s]ome officers are productive, others are not; 
nothing you can do” dropped from 18 percent before training to 10 percent 
after training.143 In short, training on the point in question substantially reduced 
supervisor fatalism about the capacity to change rank and file officer behavior 
through effective supervision.144 Training over specific techniques of 
supervision also produced impressive results. New supervisors were less likely 
to “wait and see” in response to an incident (from 17 to 8 percent), and more 
likely to “meet right away” (from 86 to 95 percent), “warn of consequences” 
(from 65 to 72 percent), and take “time to explain” (from 78 to 91 percent).145 
The NPRP report on Receptivity to Police Innovation: A Tale of Two 
Cities, meanwhile, undermines the traditional myth that the police subculture is 
resistant to change and to accountability-related changes in particular.146 First, 
the study found that officers in Department B had a far more favorable view of 
their agency’s receptivity to innovation than officers in Department A,147 
confirming the view that police departments vary on this dimension. The two 
departments also varied consistently with regard to specific innovations, with 
Department B being far more receptive than Department A.148 A troubling 
finding, given the focus of this Article, was that in both departments, EIS were 
less popular compared with respectful policing, “hot spots” policing, and crime 
analysis units.149 As discussed, infra, EIS is a vital accountability-related 
reform. Positively, Department B was more favorable than Department A on 
all of the twelve innovations, adding further support to the view that 
departments vary in terms of organizational culture.150 
IV.  DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PATTERN OR PRACTICE LITIGATION 
A. The Goals, Achievements, and Limitations of Pattern or Practice 
Litigation 
The most significant initiative regarding organizational change in policing 
involves U.S. Department of Justice “pattern or practice” investigations of 
police departments under Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994. Unlike criminal prosecutions and tort actions, the 
explicit purpose of this statute is not to punish individual officers or seek 
 
 143. Id. at 4. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 7; see also ROSENBAUM ET AL., The Life Course of New Supervisors, in THE 
NATIONAL POLICE RESEARCH PLATFORM DRAFT FINAL REPORT 6-1, 6-9. But see Skogan, supra 
note 10, at 25–26 (discussing front-line supervisors as a force in opposing reform). 
 146. MASTROFSKI & ROSENBAUM, supra note 92. 
 147. Id. at 3. 
 148. Id. at 3. 
 149. Id. at 5. 
 150. Id. at 6. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] INSTITUTIONALIZING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY REFORMS 75 
redress for particular incidents of misconduct, but to achieve organizational 
reform.151 Settlements of investigations by the Special Litigation Section have 
resulted in consent decrees, MOAs, and investigative findings letters in over 
twenty agencies.152 As noted above, some evidence indicates that several of the 
consent decrees and MOAs were successful in achieving significant 
organizational change.153 The important and as-of-yet unexamined question is 
whether the achieved reforms endure following the lifting of the consent 
decree or MOA, and become an institutionalized part of the organizational 
culture of the police departments in question. 
The various consent decrees and MOAs negotiated by the Justice 
Department contain three principal accountability-related reforms: state of the 
art use of force policies (broadly defined to include different forms of use of 
force and also procedures for the investigation of force incidents), an early 
intervention system (EIS), and an open and accessible citizen complaint 
process.154 Use of force policies are designed to provide proper guidance for 
officers. The citizen complaint process is designed to provide citizens with an 
effective avenue of redress in situations where they believe a police officer’s 
conduct was improper or unsatisfactory. And the EIS is a computerized 
database on officer performance that allows police managers to monitor that 
performance and take appropriate remedial action toward officers who exhibit 
a pattern of questionable behavior.155 
The experience of more than twenty settlements has indicated that the three 
reforms cited above involve far more than simply adding discrete elements to 
the management of a police department (e.g., the use of force policy). In 
practice, they involve a wholesale transformation of the organization related to 
accountability.156 The development of state of the art use of force policies, for 
example, requires a systematic policy development process within a 
department, often where one did not previously exist.157 New use of force 
policies further require both effective training of officers in a department 
where in-service training has been haphazard, inadequate, or even possibly 
non-existent, and meaningful supervision of officers. Meaningful supervision 
includes, among other things, utilization of an EIS by sergeants to closely 
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monitor the performance of officers under their command.158 An EIS, 
meanwhile, requires not just training over the formal mechanics of the system 
(reviewing officer performance data, identifying officers in need of 
intervention), but an entirely new way of conducting police supervision: the 
systematic review of data, identification of performance patterns, and 
undertaking non-disciplinary forms of intervention to correct officers’ 
behavior. These steps all involve changes in the traditional work habits of 
police sergeants—in short, a significant change in the organizational culture of 
the department.159 Managing the implementation of the many reforms 
simultaneously under the deadline imposed by the consent decree or MOA 
proved to be a challenge itself in some departments.160 Even in those cases 
where the independent monitors eventually concluded that particular 
departments had been successfully transformed for the better, most 
departments failed to achieve full compliance within the required five-year 
time frame.161 
Justice Department pattern and practice litigation since 1994 has been a 
major new reform effort with regard to police accountability.162 While there is 
some evidence of success in several departments,163 many questions remain 
unanswered. Missing from the mandated reforms, however, has been any 
mechanism designed to enhance the likelihood that the reforms achieved will 
be sustained over the long term.164 This issue, and a proposed remedy, is 
discussed infra in Part V. 
B. Early Intervention Systems as an Organizational Reform Tool 
An EIS (often referred to as an “early warning system”) is a major 
component of all the DOJ-negotiated consent decrees and MOAs.165 This 
Section argues that an EIS is a potentially vital tool for transforming the 
culture of a police department and a key to ensuring the continuity of 
accountability-related reforms. The EIS has emerged in recent decades as a 
powerful police accountability tool—providing a data driven process for 
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identifying officers with performance problems and for making informed 
decisions about interventions needed to correct officer performance 
problems.166 
An EIS is a computerized database of officer performance with anywhere 
from five to twenty-five or more performance indicators (citizen complaints, 
uses of force, arrests, traffic stops, etc.).167 Research and anecdotal evidence 
has confirmed the long-standing belief that in any police department a small 
group of officers are responsible for a majority of problem incidents (excessive 
force, citizen complaints).168 The EIS database establishes a foundation for 
making meaningful performance evaluations of officers.169 In this regard, it 
should be noted that assessments of police personnel evaluation systems—
published twenty years apart—were both highly critical of those systems.170 
An EIS represents a great leap forward over traditional performance 
assessment systems for the simple reason that it includes data on officer 
performance rather than subjective assessments.171 Officers identified by the 
EIS (according the parameters established for the system) are then referred for 
intervention to correct the performance problems.172 Intervention may involve 
informal or formal counseling by supervisors, referral to professional 
counseling (e.g., family or substance abuse counseling), retraining, or other 
options.173 The special power of an EIS is that it has the capacity to identify an 
officer’s specific performance problem (e.g., use of force, rudeness, special 
problem with dealing with young men or people of color), and its sources 
(personal family problems, substance abuse), and select an intervention related 
to the identified problem.174 This problem-oriented response is presumptively 
more effective than traditional group-based interventions (e.g., race and ethnic 
awareness class) that may be irrelevant for most of the officers in the group.175 
If used to its fullest capacity,176 an EIS has the potential for transforming 
the organizational culture of a police department and sustaining reform in 
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several respects.177 First, an EIS is itself a significant institutional change.178 
Second, as an institutionalized part of a department it has direct ramifications 
for other accountability mechanisms.179 Use of force reports and citizen 
complaints are major indicators in an EIS.180 Third, the data provided by the 
EIS has (potentially) an important empowering effect for supervisors, enabling 
them to document the performance problems of officers who are identified.181 
Thus, assessments of performance are no longer a matter of subjective 
opinions about good or bad police performance. As discussed above, however, 
fully utilizing the capacity of an EIS requires a significant change in the work 
routine of sergeants who are the front-line supervisors. This includes what 
sergeants do (analysis of data, etc.), how they spend their time (more time at 
their desks than on the street), and how they deal with officers under their 
command (more non-disciplinary forms of intervention rather than 
conventional disciplinary actions). 
V.  A FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING ACCOUNTABILITY-RELATED 
REFORM 
A. Charlotte, North Carolina, as a Case Study 
The challenge of institutionalizing police reform, including accountability-
related reforms, as noted at the beginning of this Article, has been neglected by 
police scholars.182 The most relevant study involves the institutionalization of 
problem-oriented policing in the Charlotte, North Carolina Police 
Department.183 While it is not directly related to accountability procedures, the 
Charlotte Police Department study and the policies and procedures adopted by 
that department provide a framework for a process to institutionalize police 
reforms. 
The Charlotte Police Department sought to institutionalize problem 
orientated policing (POP) through formal training, building POP into regular 
personnel evaluations and promotional procedures, and revising various 
departmental policies accordingly.184 In addition to several retreats, that in 
effect constituted in-service training, a federal grant funded special training—
 
not used to their fullest extent, or allowed to deteriorate. There has been no systematic research to 
assess the extent to which police departments utilize their EIS and whether the police 
department’s implementation involves the system’s minimum or its full capabilities. 
 177. Id. at 15. 
 178. Id. at 55. 
 179. Id. at 60. 
 180. See WALKER, supra note 122, at 6. 
 181. Id. at 77–78. 
 182. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 5. 
 183. Id. at 14. 
 184. Id. at 13. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] INSTITUTIONALIZING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY REFORMS 79 
for sergeants, and regular monthly meetings related to POP were instituted.185 
The study of this process involved a survey of 150 randomly selected rank and 
file officers regarding their knowledge, attitudes, and behavior about POP.186 
The study’s hypothesis was that if officers did not know about or were hostile 
to POP, one could safely conclude that POP had not been institutionalized in 
the department.187 The study also included structured interviews with all thirty-
three captains, and an examination of departmental policies and procedures 
related to POP.188 The principal finding was that POP had been successfully 
institutionalized in the department.189 Only one rank and file officer had not 
heard of POP. Half (49.2 percent) of officers felt it was a “valuable tool in 
dealing with crime and fear of crime,” and 95.8 percent reported that they had 
engaged in POP in some way.190 Among the captains, all but one demonstrated 
knowledge of POP, and 70 percent of the captains were able to provide a 
“strong definition” of the concept of problem oriented policing.191 “Strong 
definition” was operationalized as a detailed description of POP as opposed to 
a short, clichéd response that would suggest little meaningful understanding of 
the concept.192 Finally, 88 percent of the captains reported that they informally 
discussed POP with other officers on a somewhat regular basis.193 The 
interview questions on this point were designed to assess whether POP was 
part of the “day-to-day language and culture” of the department.194 
With respect to training, all thirty-three captains and 89.1 percent of the 
rank and file reported that they had participated in some formal training 
regarding POP.195 At the time of the study, new recruits received 
approximately three days of police academy training related to POP.196 In the 
field-training program (led by Police Training Officers, or PTOs), each trainee 
was required to develop a POP project and present the findings to the 
department.197 
With regard to departmental practices, POP was made a factor in both 
performance evaluations and the promotional process.198 The vast majority 
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(86.6 percent) of the rank and file and 76 percent of the captains reported that 
they were aware that it was a part of their performance evaluations, while 82.4 
percent of the rank and file and 70 percent of the captains reported they were 
aware it was a factor in promotions.199 Significantly, 85 percent of the captains 
reported that they had been rewarded for their POP-related efforts.200 
The findings regarding knowledge, attitudes and behavior clearly suggest 
that the department had indeed taken formal steps to institutionalize POP and 
that the effort, as measured in this research project, was successful.201 
However, several cautionary comments about the study are in order. The study 
involved only one department202 and the absence of a comparison department 
or departments with a different approach or history regarding POP precludes a 
richer contextual perspective. Additionally, the study was done at what might 
prove to be a high point in the department’s commitment to POP, a fact that 
might explain the extremely positive results on all of the indicators. Since the 
survey, a new police chief has arrived, and the level of commitment to POP at 
the present time is not known.203 
The framework employed in the Charlotte study sheds useful perspective 
on other police reform efforts, and whether any similar attempts to 
institutionalize the reform in question were taken. With regard to the 1970s 
NYPD anti-corruption effort, for example, the Mollen Commission reported 
years later that no steps were taken to create “institutional mechanisms” to 
sustain the reforms.204 With regard to COP, there is no evidence that, with a 
few exceptions, cities provided mandatory training of all officers regarding its 
goals and methods.205 One exception appears to have been the Chicago CAPS 
effort. While the training reached only eighteen hundred officers in a twelve 
thousand officer department—it was nonetheless extensive—and this might 
account for the generally positive findings reported in the evaluations of 
CAPS.206 
With regard to team policing, an evaluation of seven experiments in the 
1970s found that one factor contributing to failure was that “team members 
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had been left out of the planning,” and as a consequence did not understand the 
reform they were to implement and often had “erroneous” ideas about it.207 
Scott’s twenty-year assessment of POP, meanwhile, discusses training largely 
in terms of national level training that is external to individual departments, 
with no reference to the kind of department-level training found in 
Charlotte.208 
In the various Justice Department consent decrees and MOAs, there is no 
evidence that departments were required to undertake, or undertook on their 
own initiative, department-wide training about the nature and goals of the 
required reforms.209 The Department of Justice 2001 report, Principles for 
Promoting Police Integrity, is arguably the closest thing to an official 
statement of minimum expectations for policing. The Principles Report 
contains only a brief standard on training, but it is confined to training over the 
report’s substantive recommendations (e.g., use of force, EIS, citizen 
complaints) and is silent with regard to training on the nature, purpose, and 
benefits of the required reforms themselves. 210 The MOA between the 
Department of Justice, the City of Cincinnati, and the Cincinnati Police 
Department, to take one example, follows the approach in the Justice 
Department’s Principles report, and requires nothing regarding training or 
explanation of the reforms themselves.211 
B. A Model Program for Institutionalizing Accountability-Related Reforms 
This Section presents a model program for institutionalizing police 
accountability reforms, based on the preceding discussion of the Charlotte 
experience and drawing on research discussed earlier in this Article. While the 
specific program described here involves accountability related reforms, it has 
general relevance for all major reforms or changes within a police department. 
The challenge is to change the culture of the department to the point where the 
goals and values underlying the reforms are understood, accepted, and actively 
supported by a critical mass of officers.212 
Training involving accountability-related reforms should include pre-
service academy training, field training, and in-service training. Each of these 
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training units should cover the nature of the specific reform or reforms, the 
underlying values, and the potential benefits to the department, individual 
officers, and the community. The potential benefits of accountability-related 
reforms are arguably the most neglected aspect of the reform process. Officers, 
for example, generally view stricter use of force policies as an intrusion on 
their discretion and essentially a means by which supervisors can catch and 
punish them.213 All training units should emphasize the extent to which clear 
policies on use of force or other officer actions in critical incidents, however 
restrictive, provide necessary and useful guidance regarding which actions are 
prohibited or approved in given situations. The potential benefits to officers 
include helping them avoid actions that are likely to generate a citizen 
complaint or an internally generated complaint.214 Research on citizen 
complaints, for example, suggests that being the subject of complaint 
investigations is one of the greatest sources of low morale among police 
officers.215 Some law enforcement experts involved with EIS talk in terms of 
the system’s purpose being to “save” officers’ careers—by identifying their 
performance problems early and providing the proper intervention to correct 
those problems—saving them from the costs of use of force or citizen 
complaint investigations as well as having such incidents on their performance 
record.216 The EIS is the source of discontent among rank and file officers and 
supervisors.217 Rank and file officers tend to regard it as a “big brother” system 
whose primary purpose it is to catch and discipline officers.218 To the extent 
that an EIS gives management a documented record, there is some truth to that 
perception.219 Training should emphasize the point that it is intended to be 
activated only in the case of officers with repeated performance problems. One 
of the major complaints among many officers is that the department does not 
punish those officers whose performance is inadequate or unprofessional.220 
An EIS also has the potential for identifying exemplary officer performance, 
which could be measured in terms of a low ratio of citizen complaints and use 
of force incidents to arrests or field and traffic stops or both.221 
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The benefits to the department include time saved through a reduction in 
the number of allegations of misconduct,222 a reduction in lawsuits against the 
department,223 and a general improvement in community relations.224 Training 
could emphasize the potential public relations value of EIS data. Where the 
data documents decline in use of force incidents, it would communicate to the 
public that the department is vigilant in monitoring the performance of its 
officers and quick to take action to correct problems that appear. Traditionally, 
a police department’s claims that it vigorously enforces its rules are greeted 
with great skepticism by much of the public.225 This response is in large part 
because the claims are never supported by data, and the department has already 
lost trust among critical segments of the public.226 An EIS potentially 
overcomes this problem by supporting claims with data.227 An increase in use 
of force incidents, on the other hand, would alert the department to the need for 
an inquiry into the causes of that increase and the need to take corrective 
action. 
In-service training is extremely important in order to ensure continuous 
reinforcement of specific programs and procedures and the values underlying 
them. In service training should include both classroom and roll call 
training.228 In this regard, we should note the California POST standard that 
requires training on a set of “perishable skills,”229 which include a minimum of 
twelve hours every two years, with a minimum of four hours each on “Arrest 
and Control,” “Driver Training/Awareness or Driving Simulator,” and 
“Tactical Firearms or Force Options Simulator.”230 The concept of perishable 
skills recognizes that certain skills easily erode under pressures of the job and 
that it is necessary to continually reinforce those skills though training. This 
principle certainly applies to all accountability-related reforms.231 
Accountability-related reforms should also be reinforced by including 
them in performance evaluations and the promotional process—following the 
Charlotte example. An officer’s performance evaluation, for example, should 
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include a review of his or her record in the EIS. Even though an officer has not 
been identified by the system for intervention, there are undoubtedly many 
cases of officers with a higher than average number of problematic indicators 
(uses of force, citizen complaints, excessive use of leave time) that should be 
properly noted in the performance evaluation. Similarly, the EIS record should 
be a major consideration in considering officers for promotion. In this regard, 
it should be noted that the Christopher Commission report on the LAPD 
following the 1991 Rodney King incident found that (in that pre-EIS era) the 
department did not use available information such as use of force incidents, 
citizen complaints, or even disciplinary records in promotional decisions.232 In 
fact, the Christopher Commission found cases of officers given laudatory 
evaluations or promotions despite records that included serious incidents of 
officer misconduct.233 
Evidence on policing cited in this Article suggests that properly designed 
training can be effective in changing the police officer subculture. The 
traditional concept of a homogenous subculture resistant to change appears no 
longer valid. The police officer work force is now far more diverse than in the 
past.234 Some elements of that work force are more receptive to change than 
others.235 Significant variations have been found among police departments 
with regard to receptivity to change.236 Finally, properly designed training does 
appear to improve officer receptivity to innovation and change.237 In short, 
there are pockets of support or potential support for accountability-related 
reform within the American police work force that can be exploited. 
C. Monitoring the Continuity of Reforms 
Assuming that accountability reforms are instituted and a department 
adopts the program described in the above section to ensure the continuity of 
those reforms, the question becomes how to ensure the continuity-related effort 
itself continues. The following discussion argues that the police auditor form 
of citizen oversight represents the best answer to that question. 
The police auditor arose in the mid-1990s as an alternative to citizen 
review boards.238 Police auditors should not be confused with what are 
commonly referred to as independent police monitors. In common policing 
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usage, the term independent monitor refers to a court-appointed official 
(although in practice usually a team of experts) with responsibility for 
monitoring the implementation of a consent decree or MOA.239 The monitor is 
an officer of the court, its role is limited to the specific terms of the consent 
decree or MOA, and it goes out of existence once the decree or MOA is lifted 
by the court.240 A police auditor, by contrast, is a permanent municipal, county, 
or state agency whose role involves auditing, monitoring or reviewing any and 
every aspect of the police agency under his or her purview.241 Police auditors 
are different from citizen review boards primarily in that the latter investigate 
and review individual citizen complaints against police officers for purposes of 
determining whether the complaint is valid and the officer acted wrongly.242 
Thus, civilian review boards may be defined as embodying a “justice” model 
of oversight—oriented toward determining right or wrong with regard to a 
particular incident—while police auditors embody a “policy” model, oriented 
toward reviewing and potentially changing departmental policies.243 Review 
boards are retrospective, examining what happened,244 while police auditors 
are prospective, seeking to influence future actions.245 Police auditors may 
respond to particular incidents or controversies, but their primary responsibility 
is to review policies and procedures of the agency under their purview and to 
make recommendations for change.246 Particularly important, police auditors 
have the power to initiate investigations of any issue at their own discretion 
and are not limited to the terms of a consent decree or MOA.247 The Special 
Counsel to the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, for example, has 
investigated innumerable issues since 1993, with most of those embracing a 
number of subsidiary issues.248 Police auditors do not have the power to 
mandate changes, however.249 Their power lies in their capacity to investigate 
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broadly and to make their findings and recommendations public.250 Finally, it 
should be noted that some oversight agencies, such as the Office of Police 
Complaints, combine both complaint review and auditing functions.251 
Particularly relevant for this Article are the examples of police auditors 
identifying the deterioration of important reforms the departments experienced 
under their purview. In 2003, for example, the Special Counsel to the LASD 
issued a highly critical report finding that the department’s EIS (known as the 
Personnel Performance Index [PPI]) had declined in some important respects 
and was not being used to its full capacity.252 The PPI, at that time, was widely 
regarded as perhaps the best EIS in the nation, and it had served as a model for 
systems in other departments.253 The Special Counsel, however, found that the 
PPI was not being used to its fullest capacity and suffered from a number of 
problems.254 These included failure to enter data in a timely manner, a high 
rate of errors (more than 50 percent) in citizen complaint reports, 
inconsistencies in the reporting of certain incidents, and a lack of 
understanding about the PPI on the part of some supervisors.255 A follow-up 
report a year later found that the LASD had made significant progress in 
correcting the problems identified in the previous report.256 
A second example, also from the Special Counsel to the LASD, involves 
the checkered history of the Century Station (what would be called a precinct 
station in most departments).257 The station was marked by a number of 
problems in the early 1990s, including a high rate of officer-involved 
shootings, a very bad image of the Station in the community, and, within the 
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department, low officer morale and a high rate of officer turnover.258 
Investigation by the Special Counsel found several serious management 
deficiencies: a sergeant-to-officer span of control that was twice the 
department’s own standard of eight to one;259 use of the station as a training 
ground for new officers;260 low morale and a desire for most officers to transfer 
out as quickly as possible.261 A series of changes corrected many of these 
problems and the number of shootings had declined substantially—despite the 
fact that external factors such as the crime rate and community violence 
remained stable.262 Several management reforms contributed to this positive 
development: the Station had for the first time a full complement of lieutenants 
and sergeants, sergeants were spending more time in the field, supervisors 
imposed stricter standards for arrests (resulting in a decline in the number of 
arrests), standards for selecting field training officers had been raised, and the 
department had reduced the number of officer foot pursuits which were related 
to many shootings in the past.263 In 2001, however, the Special Counsel 
revisited the station and found that standards had eroded and the number of 
officer-involved shootings had returned to high levels compared with other 
Stations in the LASD. The captain responsible for the successful reforms had 
transferred out.264 
The Special Counsel to the LASD reports on the Century Station 
illuminate a problem that is inherent in policing and important to the subject of 
this Article. While the initial improvements in the Century Station were 
impressive, the speed with which they deteriorated is deeply troubling. There is 
reason to believe that the Century Station experience is a common 
phenomenon in American police departments, and this only heightens the 
importance of devising procedures to ensure the continuity of reforms. 
The work of the Denver, Colorado, Office of the Independent Monitor 
(OIM) provides an example of how a police auditor can address a full range of 
accountability-related issues to ensure their continuity. The 2010 OIM Annual 
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Report provides a status report on its six goals for the year.265 The goals 
include: implementing the recommendations of an outside report on policies 
related to deadly force or other forms of force;266 a continuation of the citizen 
complaint mediation program;267 conducting an annual evaluation of the 
Denver Police Department’s EIS (known as the Personnel Assessment System 
[PAS]);268 monitoring the implementation of the Denver Sheriff’s 
Department’s disciplinary matrix (a new management tool designed to ensure 
consistency in disciplinary actions);269 improving the timeliness of imposition 
of discipline in the Denver Police Department;270 and evaluating the police 
department’s policies, training, and practices related to alleged “excited 
delirium” cases.271 
The Denver OIM list and discussion of goals for the year is ambitious and 
impressive. All of the items involve accountability-related reforms, including 
all three of the major items in DOJ-negotiated consent decrees and MOAs: use 
of force policies, the EIS, and the citizen complaint process. Indeed, what is 
particularly impressive is the comprehensive nature of the auditing process by 
the OIM—covering such a wide range of issues.272 
The work of the Omaha Police Auditor, currently inactive due to the 
termination of the initial auditor in 2006, offers an example of a missed 
opportunity in police auditing, which resulted in a failure to correct police 
problems before they escalate into more serious incidents.273 In a series of 
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Quarterly Reports and then in a comprehensive report on traffic stop-related 
issues, the Omaha Police Auditor documented a variety of practices by Omaha 
police officers that ranged from the illegal to the unprofessional—the failure of 
the police department to provide adequate training and supervision for officers 
and, in some instances, even to enforce its own policies.274 The problems 
included vehicle stops and arrests without adequate legal justification, pat 
down searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, using visual estimates of 
vehicle speed in violation of state statute, failure to conduct after action 
reviews of use of force incidents, failure to enforce the department’s policy on 
accepting gratuities, and others.275 The Auditor was fired in October 2006, and 
improper conduct by officers worsened to the point where a set of very serious 
use of force incidents in 2011 prompted a community group request for a 
Justice Department pattern or practice investigation.276 
In short, the work of various police auditors from around the country 
provide instructive examples of how this form of citizen oversight can provide 
a form of continuous auditing and monitoring that is likely to ensure that police 
departments continue to maintain accountability-related reforms. 
It is worth noting that the work of police auditors addresses an issue that is 
central to the decades-long controversy over the role of the Supreme Court as 
an agency of police accountability. Summarizing and extending this debate, 
Rachel Harmon has pointed out that the Supreme Court lacks the institutional 
capacity not only to enforce its decisions (apart from appeals that reach the 
Court), but also the capacity “to undertake complex empirical analysis of 
policing or to constrain the police beyond identifying and enforcing 
constitutional rights.”277 Police auditors do have that capacity, are able to 
choose issues at their own discretion, and are able to conduct their own 
investigations or employ independent experts for investigations.278 The 
inherently broad mandate of police auditors addresses the related problem 
discussed by Harmon that the focus on key Supreme Court decisions (e.g., 
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Mapp v. Ohio279 and Miranda v. Arizona280), has greatly narrowed the scope of 
research and discussions of policing and police accountability to an 
unfortunate degree.281 As Harmon states, “scholars take their subject to be 
Supreme Court cases involving the Constitution rather than the problem of 
policing.”282 It is a truism in police studies that law enforcement activities that 
are likely to involve Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues constitute only a 
portion of police activities. Focusing on constitutional issues, consequently, 
ignores the majority of police–citizen interactions that involve order 
maintenance, problem solving, and service. In short, police auditors are not 
only a necessary instrument in terms of sustaining police reforms, but can be a 
major instrument in a new and broadly defined police reform effort generally. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Sustaining accountability-related reforms is an important frontier issue in 
policing that has not received sufficient attention from reform activists or 
police scholars.283 There is a long history of important reforms that, for one 
reason or another, simply faded away.284 Skogan has ably listed the formidable 
list of factors that cause reforms to fail, and we should not lose sight of the 
challenges that face both instituting and institutionalizing reform in police 
departments.285 The problem of sustaining reform, moreover, extends to all 
aspects of policing, including: community-oriented policing, problem-oriented 
policing, and essentially all aspects of police management.286 
This Article has examined the factors related to sustaining reforms 
including the impact of the police officer subculture—which many, if not most, 
police experts regard as one of the major obstacles to reform and the continuity 
of reforms that are achieved.287 Citing research on the changing police officer 
work force and new research from the National Police Research Platform—this 
Article has argued that the police officer work force is not as monolithic as 
traditionally portrayed. There is evidence that some departments and officers 
are more amenable to change (and, thus, reform) than others, and properly 
designed training can have a positive impact with regard to attitudes toward 
accountability-related reform.288 
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This Article concludes with a recommended model policy to enhance the 
sustainability of accountability-related reforms.289 The policy involves 
developing training procedures designed to explain the nature, goals, and 
benefits of such reforms to all officers in a department.290 Traditional practice 
in reform efforts has neglected this dimension of training and its potential 
impact on the culture of a department.291 The result is that major reforms—
including Justice Department consent decrees and memoranda of agreement—
appear to rank and file officers as offensive bolts from the blue, without much 
warning and even less explanation.292 The model policy involves training 
officers to explain major reforms that occur.293 This approach is based on the 
example of the institutionalization of problem oriented policing in Charlotte, 
North Carolina’s Police Department.294 Research from the National Police 
Research Platform suggests that training can increase the receptivity of police 
officers to innovations.295 
The final element of the model involves continuous external monitoring to 
ensure that accountability reforms are being maintained in a department.296 The 
experience of several police auditors, and an alternative form of citizen 
oversight of the police, provides a practical example of how continuous 
monitoring can be achieved.297 
In conclusion, maintaining the continuity of accountability-related reforms 
in policing is an important problem that has been neglected to date. This 
Article has offered a model program for ensuring the continuity of such 
reforms by institutionalizing them in a police department based on the 
evidence from several different aspects of policing. 
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